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* Forthcoming in Synthese.  
How Can Necessary Facts Call for Explanation? 
Dan Baras 
Abstract: While there has been much discussion about what makes some mathematical proofs 
more explanatory than others, and what are mathematical coincidences, in this article I explore 
the distinct phenomenon of mathematical facts that call for explanation. The existence of 
mathematical facts that call for explanation stands in tension with virtually all existing accounts 
of “calling for explanation”, which imply that necessary facts cannot call for explanation. In this 
paper I explore what theoretical revisions are needed in order to accommodate this phenomenon. 
One of the important upshots is that, contrary to the current consensus, low prior probability is 
not a necessary condition for calling for explanation. In the final section I explain how the results 
of this inquiry help us make progress in assessing Hartry Field's style of reliability argument 
against mathematical Platonism and against robust realism in other domains of necessary facts, 
such as ethics.   
 
Keywords: Calling for Explanation; Strikingness; Necessary Facts; Probability; Logical 
Omniscience; Philosophy of Mathematics 
 
1 The dilemma 
Regarding some facts we judge that they call for explanation, while for others we do not. 
Suppose you take an ordinary looking coin and toss it hundreds of times. Suppose it lands 
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HTHTHTHTHT…  (H=heads; T=tails) and continues in this pattern every single toss. Such an 
occurrence would no doubt call for explanation. On the other hand, if the result were a messy, 
insignificant sequences of H and T, the occurrence would not call for explanation. Another 
example. Suppose you take a chimpanzee and seat it by a typewriter. The chimpanzee, 
surprisingly, starts typing at great speed. Suppose it turns out that the chimpanzee was typing 
predictions of many future events. And suppose that every single prediction is verified. Such an 
occurrence would surely call for explanation. Whereas, if it turned out that the chimpanzee was 
typing gibberish, it would not call for explanation. Any number of examples can be given to 
illustrate this distinction.
1
  
Many authors have noticed a salient feature of the typical examples that appear in the literature: 
They are all occurrences with very low prior probability. Therefore, it is commonly believed that 
a necessary condition for calling for explanation is a low prior probability. Thus, Paul Horwich 
says that "the improbability of an event is not sufficient – but it does seem necessary (Horwich, 
1982, p. 101)". George Schlesinger says that "all extraordinary events are highly improbable" 
(Schlesinger, 1991, p. 95). Neil Manson and Michael Thrush say that "[i]mprobability…seems to 
be … a necessary condition…" (Manson & Thrush, 2003, p. 80). David Harker says that "[i]t is 
necessary that we judge the event improbable" (Harker, 2012, p. 253). And Roger White says 
that "extremely improbable…is part of what makes something call for explanation" (White, 
2018, p. 31).
 2
 Andreas Mogensen goes as far as to claim that “no one disputes the necessity of 
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 For more examples, see Leslie (1989, pp. 8–19), White (2005, p. 3) and White (2018). 
2
 Some authors imply that there is a close connection between calling for explanation and improbability, but do not 
state explicitly that they view improbability as a necessary condition. Examples include Smolin (1997, p. 45) and 
Price (2002, p. 115). 
3 
 
this condition” (Mogensen, n.d., n. 24). Now the literature on what calls for explanation, not to 
be confused with the distinct issue of what explanations are, is relatively small and coarse. Any 
one of these quotes is drawn from a context that requires interpretive work, that I cannot get into 
here.
3
  For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the assumption that low prior probability is 
necessary for calling for explanation is a prevalent one, and very tempting in light of 
paradigmatic examples of contingent facts that call for explanation. One of the insights of this 
article will be that this temptation should be resisted, but let us not jump ahead.  
Mathematical results can give rise to similar calling for explanation judgments.
4
 An account of 
which facts call for explanation must accommodate mathematical facts that call for explanation. 
To date, no published account does so. In this short essay I explore which common assumptions 
must be revised to accommodate mathematical facts that call for explanation. I will not develop 
here a full account of calling for explanation. That I will do elsewhere at greater length.  
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 Sometimes the explananda are events rather than facts, sometimes the relevant property is described as "surprise" 
or "puzzlement", rather than "calling for explanation". For a more nuanced discussion of Horwich, see Baras (2019). 
For discussion of Schlesinger, see Baras (unpublished ms.).  
4
 Prior to this paper, the possibility that necessary truths can call for explanation has been raised in blogposts by 
Pruss (2013) and Berry (2017), and in Baras (2017a, p. 203) and Baras (2017b, p. 485) in the context of Hartry 
Field’s (1989, pp. 25–30) style of argument against mathematical Platonism and parallel arguments against realisms 
in other abstract domains. As I completed this paper, Berry developed and published her view in Berry (2020). I 
engage with this literature and with her article in section ‎5. In the context of philosophy of mind there is a debate 
about whether identities, such as mind-body identities, can call for explanation and some have made general claims 
about necessary facts in this context. Examples are Melnyk (2003, p. 52) and Papineau (2011, p. 9) who claim 
without much argument that necessary facts cannot call for explanation and Morris (2011, p. 378) who responds by 
citing mathematical explanations to show that they can call for explanation. These references are all to very brief 
comments. They do not explore the question in depth as I do here. (I thank Assaf Weksler for referring me to this 
debate). After completing this paper, I discovered that van Cleve (2018) explores at great length the idea that some 
necessary facts should be explained. Fortunately, there is not much overlap between the papers, so they nicely 
complement each other.   
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Let us look at examples. Suppose you measure the sides of a certain right-angled triangle and 
notice that the square of the hypotenuse equals the sum of squares of the other two sides. You 
measure hundreds of other right-angled triangles and learn that this relationship always holds. It 
seems that if you were in such a position, and were not previously familiar with Pythagoras's 
theorem, you would surely judge that this result calls for explanation.  
A classic example from number theory is the quadratic reciprocity theorem, first proved by 
Gauss, showing an unexpected relationship that holds between any two arbitrarily chosen odd 
primes. The intuition that this result is in need of explanation has motivated a continuing search 
for explanatory proofs, yielding over two hundred proofs to date. Gauss himself devised during 
the course of his life eight different proofs of the theorem, in search for a more explanatory proof 
than his initial inductive proof. William D’Alessandro uses this as a fruitful case study for 
explanation in mathematics, his starting point being that "mathematicians have viewed [quadratic 
reciprocity] as a remarkable fact that calls out for explanation", a claim he supports with many 
quotes from mathematicians (D’Alessandro, 2020, sec. 2.3.1).5 
Examples like this exist in abundance. One rich repository of examples is Marc Lange's  work on 
explanation in mathematics (2016, Chapters 7–9). Lange is not concerned with calling for 
explanation, but his discussion of what makes certain proofs more explanatory than others is full 
of examples of mathematical results that give rise to calling for explanation intuitions. This is of 
course no coincidence. We become interested in looking for explanatory proofs when we come 
across a result that intuitively calls for explanation. Here is one very simple example:  
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 I thank an anonymous referee for this example.  
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Take an ordinary calculator keyboard (though without the zero): 
 
We can form a six-digit number by taking the three digits on any row, column, or main 
diagonal on the keyboard in forward and then in reverse order. For instance, the bottom 
row taken from left to right, and then right to left, yields 123321. There are 16 such 
“calculator numbers”: 123321, 321123, 456654, 654456, 789987, 987789, 147741, 
741147, 258852, 852258, 369963, 963369, 159951, 951159, 357753, and 753357. As 
you can easily verify (with a calculator!), every one of these numbers is divisible by 37. 
Is this (as the title of a recent Mathematical Gazette article asks) a coincidence? (Lange, 
2016, p. 276) 
My guess is that this result ignites some curiosity within you. (You may want to have a look at 
the explanation in Lange (ibid) or Nummela (1987)). On the other hand, if I point out to you that 
5*8,965=44,825 and 8,563/47=182.1914… and a few more arbitrarily chosen mathematical 
facts, we do not have similar intuitions. These examples demonstrate that there are mathematical 
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theorems that call for explanation. While this is old news to mathematicians, the implications for 
general accounts of calling for explanation have not been explored previously.
6
  
If mathematical theorems can call for explanation, then arguably there are facts of logical 
necessity that call for explanation. For this to follow, I need not assume that all mathematical 
facts are logically necessary. I can set aside the complicated question of what the precise modal 
status of mathematical axioms is.
7
 If a certain mathematical result is implied by a set of axioms 
and rules of deduction, I take it that the fact that the theorem follows from those axioms and 
rules is a fact of logic.
8
 In all of the examples of mathematical theorems that call for explanation, 
part of what calls for explanation is that fact of logic, i.e. that the theorem follows from the 
axioms and rules. Therefore, examples of mathematical facts that call for explanation are also 
examples of facts of logic that call for explanation.  
The claim that facts of logic can call for explanation is incompatible with the claim that low 
probability is a necessary condition for calling for explanation only if we make a further standard 
assumption. The standard way of applying the axioms of probability to propositions includes as 
an axiom that every proposition that represents a logically necessary fact has probability 1.
9
 If we 
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 What precisely is a mathematical explanation and how does it stand in relation to other types of explanation? These 
are difficult questions that I cannot address. I note though that Lange's (2016) account seems attractive. For a 
classic, see Steiner (1978). For a  recent survey, see Mancosu (2018). 
7
 For a recent argument for the necessity of mathematics from mathematical practice, see Hawthorne & Yli-Vakkuri 
(2018). For doubts about the necessity of mathematics, see Field (1989, Chapter 7). 
8
 For a formal argument (unfortunately, not very accessible to non-mathematicians) that mathematical claims can be 
translated to hypothetical claims in modal logic (S5) about what follows necessarily from certain axioms, see 
Hellman (1993, 1996). I remain neutral with regard to his further claim that this is all that mathematical claims 
amount to. (I thank Sharon Berry for discussion and the reference to Hellman).  
9
 See Hájek (2011, sec. 1), Talbott (2006, sec. supplement) and Strevens (2017, p. 13).  
7 
 
assume accordingly that necessary facts have a high probability, the result is a triad of 
incompatible claims:   
(i) There are truths of classical logic that call for explanation.  
(ii) All truths of classical logic have high probability.  
(iii) A fact calls for explanation only if it has low prior probability.  
Which of these claims should we reject? Or is there some ambiguity here such that the claims are 
not really inconsistent? This is the dilemma that I wish to explore in this paper. Some dilemmas 
are hard to solve. In this case I will argue that once we get clearer on what we mean precisely by 
“calling for explanation” and by “probability”, the dilemma is solved. Solving this dilemma is 
not the only purpose of this paper. (If it were, section ‎4 would suffice). The dilemma serves also 
as an excuse to delve more deeply into each of the three claims. As we will see, each of the 
claims needs refinement.  
In the next three sections I explore each of the three principles in turn. Then, in section 5, I 
discuss an implication. I argue that understanding how necessary facts can call for explanation is 
important for making progress on assessing reliability arguments against mathematical Platonism 
and realism about normativity. In particular, I argue that necessary facts call for explanation, but 
there is little evidence that they do so in the sense needed to block a certain trivializing response 
to reliability arguments. My conclusions are summarized in the final section.  
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2 What does "calling for explanation" mean?  
What do we mean when we say that some fact calls for explanation? In practice, the term is 
ambiguous and different people mean different things.
10
 I will now describe four different 
meanings of the term, the list is not exhaustive, all of which apply to the examples of the 
contingent facts that call for explanation. We will then consider which of those meanings applies 
to the mathematical examples.  
Sometimes, when people say that a certain fact calls for explanation, or that a certain hypothesis 
would call for explanation if it were true, people refer to a psychological phenomenon. They 
mean that a certain fact gives rise to a sense of curiosity or an interest in discovering an 
explanation for that fact. Let us call this purported fact E (as in explanandum). 
(1) Psychological:  E gives rise to a feeling of curiosity and interest in discovering what 
the explanation of E is.  
Normally, there is an epistemic precondition for having such curiosity. The precondition is that 
at present, given one’s background assumptions about the world, (these may or may not 
constitute knowledge) one does not possess (i.e. justifiably believe) an explanation for the given 
fact. Let us call this set of background assumptions A. Sometimes when people say that a fact 
calls for explanation, they mean to say that: 
(2) Lack explanation: Given a set of background assumptions about the world A, we 
currently lack an explanation for E. 
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 For examples and some more elaboration, see Baras & Shenker (2020). 
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Other times, people mean more than just us lacking an explanation. They mean in addition that 
we have some special reason to believe that there is in fact an explanation to be found. And by 
this they mean to exclude the possibility that E is coincidental.
11
 That is, they mean that:  
(3) Reason to expect an explanation: Given a set of background assumptions about the 
world A, we have some reason to believe that E has an explanation (perhaps a special 
kind of explanation).
12
  
That means that either the background assumptions imply an explanation that we failed to notice, 
or there is some further fact to be learned that, together with the background assumptions, will 
explain the hypothesized fact.  
Sometimes, however, people mean something with even stronger epistemic import. They take 
the fact that some purported fact calls for explanation as a reason to reject certain background 
assumptions, or else to disbelieve that the purported fact is in fact a fact. When they say that E 
calls for explanation, they mean that: 
(4) Reason to revise beliefs: It is implausible that E is a coincidence (in virtue of a certain 
property of E) and therefore, if a set of background assumptions A implies that E is 
                                                 
11
 In ordinary conversation, “coincidence” is sometimes used as synonymous with “lacks an explanation”. Other 
times, people use “coincidence” and “explanation” differently, such that a coincidence is considered a legitimate 
type of explanation. My use of these terms here (and I’m following a core of the literature) is in accordance with the 
former, not the latter.  
12
 There is a theoretical question here, which I will explore elsewhere, whether the claim is just that E must have an 
explanation, or a stronger claim, that E must have a particular kind of explanation. For the purposes of this article, 
the distinction will not matter. For preliminary discussion, see Baras (2019) and Baras (2020).  
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coincidental, then that is a reason to either disbelieve A or disbelieve that E is the 
case.
13
  
When people say that some fact calls for explanation, they often mean some combination of 
claims 1–4. All these claims apply to and can be illustrated by the opening examples for 
contingent facts that call for explanation. Let us demonstrate using the coin example.  
If a coin were to land in a very orderly sequence such as that mentioned above, it would surely 
make us curious (claim 1). We would be interested in discovering how it is that the coin lands in 
such an orderly pattern. Part of why we have this sense of curiosity is that, as we imagine the 
scenario, it would also be the case that we lacked an explanation for these facts (claim 2). 
Moreover, a coin landing so many times in such an orderly sequence seems like something that 
ought to have an explanation. We do seem to have a reason to believe that it has an explanation 
(claim 3). Finally, we seem to have a reason to reject certain background assumptions that we 
would have had otherwise had (claim 4). If we originally thought that the coin was an ordinary 
fair coin and the tosses were independent, we would now suspect that both of these claims are 
false. Rather, we should think that there is something different about the coin or the tosses such 
that each toss is bound to land on the opposite side of the previous toss. In this original version of 
the case, we would be led to reject some of our background assumptions. A variant on the case 
demonstrates that sometimes, the right response is to disbelieve the purported explanandum 
rather than any background assumptions. Suppose that instead of directly observing the coin, you 
were told by another person about the coin. Even if this other person would otherwise be 
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 This epistemic principle is sometimes called “the striking principle” because some authors call the property in 
virtue of which a fact calls for explanation “strikingness”. For references to authors who endorse this principle and 
arguments that rely on it as a premise, see Baras (2019, 2020)   
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trustworthy, in this instance we would have a strong reason to doubt the testimony. That is, we 
should disbelieve that a coin landed in such a sequence.  
Now let us see which of these claims applies to the mathematical examples. In what sense does 
the calculator example call for explanation? You are likely curious about it and interested in 
learning what the explanation is (claim 1). Assuming you haven’t looked at Lange yet, you 
currently lack an explanation for this phenomenon (claim 2). And, you intuitively believe that 
there likely is some explanation to be found (claim 3). In these three ways, the mathematical 
examples are just like the contingent examples. However, the example is not one in which we 
have some reason to reject the result or some background assumption (not claim 4). Once you 
become confident that the calculator result holds, there is no salient background assumption that 
you ought to revise (except for the fact that you did not expect in advance to discover this 
phenomenon). And if another person would tell you about this result, you would have no special 
reason to doubt it, at least in comparison with any other mathematical claim that that other 
person might make and which you have not yet proven or disproven on your own.  
It might matter whether necessary facts call for explanation in sense 4 for reliability arguments 
against mathematical Platonism and similar arguments. I will say more about this shortly, in 
section Error! Reference source not found.. This does give me reason to pause and consider a 
bit more closely whether mathematical facts call for explanation in sense 4.  I will now raise two 
reasons to doubt my previous claim.  
First, there is a reason to doubt that even in cases like calculator numbers, the mathematical fact 
really does not call for explanation in the fourth sense. Why is it that mathematical examples of 
the type discussed do not seem to call for explanation in the fourth sense of putting into doubt 
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either the purported facts or the background assumptions? Here is a suggestion. When we come 
to believe a mathematical fact, it is usually on the basis of a very reliable method, a proof, and 
therefore once we accept that some mathematical claim is true, for instance, that all calculator 
numbers are divisible by 37, it would take a lot to put this belief into doubt. Furthermore, even 
when we lack an explanation for some mathematical fact, the ordinary situation is that our 
background assumptions do not rule out the possibility that there is such an explanation. For 
instance, I cannot think of any background belief that I have that would imply that calculator 
numbers being divisible by 37 is a coincidence. In addition, our background assumptions about 
math tend to be assumptions of which we have high credence and strong justificatory support, so 
it would take a lot to put those into doubt. For these reasons, even if a fact called for explanation 
in the fourth sense, of giving us reason to doubt the fact or background assumptions, this would 
typically not have a felt impact on our beliefs.  
If this suggestion is correct, it may be more accurate to say that mathematical facts of the kind 
explored in this paper do give us reason to doubt background assumptions that imply that the 
facts are coincidental, that is, call for explanation in sense 4, however, the reason is either 
outweighed or doesn’t apply to our beliefs, for the reasons mentioned.  
Second, perhaps instead of distinguishing between senses 3 and 4 of calling for explanation, it 
would be simpler and more accurate to posit the following sense of calling for explanation:
14
  
 3′: There is reason to believe that E has an explanation. 
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 I thank Assaf Weksler for this suggestion.  
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Whenever E having an explanation is compatible with background assumptions, if E calls for 
explanation in sense 3′, that implies that it also calls for explanation in sense 3. On the other 
hand, whenever E having an explanation is incompatible with background assumptions, 3′ 
implies 4. If this is a better way of understanding ways in which facts can call for explanation, it 
implies that when mathematical facts of the type explored here call for explanation, they 
essentially call for explanation in the same ways that contingent facts call for explanation.  
In sum, the mathematical examples clearly support the claim that there are truths of classical 
logic that call for explanation (i), if by calling for explanation we mean some combination of 
claims 1,2 or 3, that is, that we are curious, currently lack an explanation and have some reason 
to believe that there is an explanation. However, if we mean claim 4, that we have reason to 
disbelieve some background assumption or the explanandum, then it is less clear that 
mathematical examples of the sort illustrated above support the claim that there are logical truths 
that call for explanation.
15
 
3 What does probability mean? 
What precisely does it mean to say that facts of logical necessity have probability 1 (ii)? 
Interpretations of probability can be divided to two main classes: epistemic and objective 
(Gillies, 2000, p. 2). I will discuss the implications of each in turn. These two categories may not 
be exhaustive. In the end of this section I will say something about a type of interpretation of 
probability that may not be reducible to either of the two.  
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 Perhaps there are other examples that do support the possibility of mathematical claims calling for explanation in 
sense (4). Some colleagues have suggested to me that there are arguments against certain mathematical axioms that 
can be understood as based on the claim that those axioms imply that a mathematical fact that calls for explanation 
could not be explained. Assessing such proposed examples would require further research.  
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According to epistemic interpretations, probability functions represent degrees of belief, or 
credences (or degrees of confirmation or justification), that subjects have (or can have or should 
have) for sets of propositions. The closer the probability of some proposition is to 1, the more 
certain the represented subject is of that proposition. Actual people's beliefs probably never 
conform to the axioms of probability. One reason is that most of us probably have some 
inconsistent doxastic attitudes. That is why there is no representation of credences as probability 
functions without some idealization.
16
 Attributing probability 1, interpreted as full confidence, to 
all logically necessary propositions is one such idealization. Since it implies that we are fully 
confident of every logical truth, it is often called logical omniscience. It is an idealization since 
people do not even have the capacity to be logically omniscient.
 
One reason is that many logical 
truths are so complicated that their proof is beyond our cognitive capabilities. Another, is that we 
are logically fallible, so arguably we should rarely if ever be fully confident in our logical 
deductions (Schechter, 2013).The question to ask is whether in the context of necessary facts that 
call for explanation, the idealization is appropriate.  
There are at least two types of justifications for idealization involved here.
17
 The first is 
pragmatic. For instance, probability functions are relatively simple and well understood 
mathematically. Using them often simplifies matters. The second is normative. When 
representing credences using probability functions, we typically are not trying to represent what 
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 Other adherents of epistemic interpretations add additional constraints for the priors because they believe that not 
every probability distribution that conforms to the axioms is rational. Such views are often called “logical” 
interpretations of probability.  
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 I’m inspired here by Colyvan (2013), who distinguishes three types of motivations for idealization in normative 
domains. Colyvan lists mathematical simplicity as an independent type of motivation whereas I group it with other 
pragmatic considerations. (I thank Arnon Levy for acquainting me with this discussion).  
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actual people actually believe. Rather, we represent what actual or hypothetical people ought to 
believe. For example, even if nobody actually has fully coherent beliefs, using a framework that 
implies a certain kind of coherence can be fine, given that we ought to, or, would be 
epistemically better off (other things being equal (which is never the case)), if our beliefs were 
coherent. Both types of justification suggest that sometimes, certain idealizations lose their 
justification.  
Attempts to model epistemic probability without logical omniscience demonstrate that without 
this idealization the task of modeling gets very complex and difficult.
18
 Hence, there are 
pragmatic benefits to this idealization. However, the fact that the idealization makes things 
simpler does not make it accurate. When we are interested in what actual people believe, we 
must take into account that they are not logically omniscient. And when we are interested in 
what they ought to believe, we must take into account that people do not even have the capacity 
to be logically omniscient. 
Similarly, normative justifications for idealization have their limits. When modeling what we 
ought to believe, in contrast to what we actually believe, different levels of idealization are 
possible because there are many ways in which our beliefs can be better than they actually are. 
And I suggest that correspondingly, there are many senses of epistemic ought. Our beliefs would 
be better if they were actually all true. I suggest that this permits us to say that, in a sense, our 
beliefs ought to be all true. Our interests can determine how far we are willing to depart from our 
actual beliefs and capacities in a given context. Our beliefs would be better if they were fully 
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 For an attempt to develop a formal representation of credences without logical omniscience, see Gaifman (2004). 
Bjerring (2013) demonstrates difficulties in using an impossible worlds framework for this task. 
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coherent. I suggest that this permits us to say that in a sense, we ought to have fully coherent 
beliefs. And so on. It is therefore correct to say that, in a sense, our beliefs ought to be logically 
consistent. It therefore makes normative sense as well to build in the idealization of logical 
omniscience into a formal epistemological framework, i.e. the Bayesian framework.
19
 However, 
even if we strive to be logically omniscient, we must keep in mind that we do not have the 
capacity to be such. This is true especially when we are theorizing about our beliefs in a domain 
of necessary truths. In such a context, the logical omniscience idealization is less appropriate, 
even from a normative perspective.  
If we understand probability as epistemic probability, then the claim that (ii) truths of classical 
logic have probability 1 is an idealization that should be given up in some contexts. That is 
because we often, in a sense, should have less than full confidence in logical facts. And we can 
even, in a sense, be justified in having low credence. Prior to reading Lange or calculating, if you 
would have asked me how confident I am that all calculator numbers are divisible by 37, I would 
have said not in the least (=very low). And it seems that, at least in a sense, that is how I should 
respond. One should not be confident that calculator numbers are divisible by 37 without 
calculating or receiving reliable testimony for that claim.   
If by probability we mean objective probability, then it is difficult to reject the claim that (ii) 
truths of classical logic have probability 1. According to objective interpretations, probabilities 
are some sort of mind-independent facts of the world. Precisely which facts, and whether it is 
even reasonable to attribute such facts to our world, are very difficult questions to answer. It does 
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 For a defense of accepting the logical omniscience idealization as a normative idealization without global fact 
omniscience, see Christensen (2004, pp. 153–157) and Smithies (2015).  
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seem plausible however that logical truths, truths that could not have been false in a very broad 
sense of could, should be understood as having probability 1.  This is implied by all existing 
objective interpretations of probability. Whether you think of objective probability as a 
representation of an actual or hypothetical frequency, or of a propensity of some kind, logical 
truths never fail even in hypothetical scenarios, and therefore must be of objective probability 1.   
There may be a third category of interpretations of probability (Hájek, 2011, sec. 3). Some think 
of probability as a measure of objective evidential support conceived as existing in abstraction 
from any actual or hypothetical belief. If we conceive of probability in this way, then we should 
accept the claim that every logical truth receives probability 1. It would be inappropriate to call 
this an idealization of logical omniscience because according to this interpretation, probability is 
not directly linked to what any person knows or rightly believes. According to this conception, 
probability is a kind of logical relation, and therefore logical relations should be built in. This 
interpretation is close in some ways to epistemic interpretations, since evidential support plays a 
dominant role in determining what we should believe or what we know. However, in another 
way it is closer to objective interpretations, as it is not an attempt to model something about us, 
unideal creatures that we are. Therefore, in the context of assigning probability 1 to logical 
truths, this possible third type of interpretation falls in with the objective interpretation.  
In sum, whether we should or should not accept the claim that (ii) truths of classical logic have 
probability 1 depends on what we mean by probability. I argued that if we interpret probability 
epistemically then (ii) should be given up. Not in general, but rather in specific contexts like that 
of analyzing necessary facts that call for explanation. If on the other hand we mean by 
probability something independent of what we do or should believe, then we should accept (ii).  
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4 Is low prior probability necessary for calling for explanation? 
Whether we interpret probability epistemically or objectively, I believe that we should reject the 
claim that low probability is a necessary condition for calling for explanation (iii) in all the 
mentioned senses of calling for explanation. Although in this paper my discussion of (iii) is 
motivated by cases of necessary facts that call for explanation, we can argue against (iii) using 
contingent examples as well.  
Let us begin with objective probability. Facts with high objective probability can call for 
explanation in all four senses of call for explanation. Take the coin example for instance. In the 
scenario, for all that you know, it may be the case that the coin has very high objective 
probability of landing in that particular sequence. It might be a special coin tossed in a special 
way such that objectively, it cannot but land in that sequence. However, given that we do not 
know this, the coin tosses call for explanation in all four senses. It gives rise to curiosity; we lack 
an explanation; we would suspect that there is an explanation; and we should reject the prior 
belief that the coin is ordinary and the tosses independent.  
Now let us consider epistemic probability. Facts with high epistemic probability can also call for 
explanation. Suppose you have been tossing the coin for quite some time now. What should your 
degree of confidence be that it will continue landing HTHTHTHT…? By now, it should be quite 
high. This in no way diminishes the fact that the coin tosses call, and will continue calling, for 
explanation in all four senses. Here is another example. Suppose before tossing the coin, a 
trustworthy friend tells you that the coin you are about to toss is such that it always lands on the 
opposite side of the previous toss. Now you should expect it to land in the alternating sequence. 
And if the probability of a proposition just means the degree to which you should expect it to be 
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true, as epistemic interpretations say, then prior to tossing the coin the probability of it landing 
HTHT… will be high. Nevertheless, after it is tossed it will call for explanation no less.  
Of course, a key question is, when we talk about low prior probability, what precisely do we 
mean? Prior to what? My analysis of the coin examples assumes that it means the probability of 
a proposition prior to learning that it is true. In the first case, it is the probability that the coin will 
continue landing HTHT… after I have tossed the coin several times but before I continue tossing 
it. In the second case, it is the probability of it landing HTHT after receiving a trustworthy 
testimony. You may suggest that there is an alternative analysis of these examples that does not 
imply that a fact with high prior probability can call for explanation. The alternative says that the 
relevant probability function is the one at an even earlier time, prior to having tossed the coin at 
all or hearing any testimony. However, the question just becomes starker. Why should it matter 
what I should have expected a while back, to whether a fact calls for explanation? My 
expectations at an earlier time seem irrelevant, and the choice of the relevant earlier time seems 
unprincipled and ad hoc as well.  
A final suggestion is that prior probability should not be interpreted temporally, but rather, it is a 
matter of what our theories, the theories we justifiably believe, predict, setting aside additional 
information about the occurrence.
20
 In the coin example, the theory is supposed to be that the 
coin is fair. Once we set aside information about how the coin landed or how exactly it was 
tossed, the fair-coin theory predicts that all sequences are equiprobable, and therefore have low 
probability. I do not believe this proposal succeeds. In the testimony example, our theory 
regarding the coin should not be that the coin is fair. In fact, we should be confident that the 
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correct theory, whatever it is, predicts the alternating sequence. In addition, this suggestion will 
not help with mathematical examples where all mathematical theorems, whether they call for 
explanation or not, are implied by the axioms.  
From all these considerations, that is, mathematical facts that call for explanation and expected 
contingent facts that call for explanation, and the seeming irrelevance of expectations at a 
previous time, I conclude that low prior probability is not a necessary condition for calling for 
explanation.  
You may wonder at this point, why then did (iii) seem compelling to begin with? How did it 
come to be that a thoughtful philosopher pronounces that “no one disputes the necessity of this 
condition” (Mogensen, n.d., n. 24)?  I suggest that we were initially confused because, although 
low probability is not a necessary condition for calling for explanation, there typically is a close 
connection between calling for explanation and low probability interpreted epistemically. A fact 
with low epistemic prior probability is just a fact that we should not have predicted, given our 
prior evidence. Now there is a close connection between being able to explain and being able to 
predict such that if I don't possess an explanation for some explanandum e then it will also 
typically be the case that I could not predict e. Likewise with the converse. Typically, I can 
predict some e for the same reason that I can explain e once it occurs. If I know that a certain die 
is weighted towards landing six, then I can predict that it will land six on most tosses. It is no 
coincidence that after tossing the die and observing that it lands six most of the times, I possess 
an explanation for the occurrence. Still, explanation and prediction are not fully correlated. 
Whether we can possess an explanation for e without being able to predict e is a controversial 
and complex issue. However, it is uncontroversial that there are facts that we can predict without 
being able to explain them. For instance, if we discover a correlation between two variables, we 
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can then predict one variable based on the other, despite a lack of an explanation for the 
correlation. Correlation, as we all know, does not imply causation, nor does it imply explanation. 
Or to take a simpler example, suppose a trustworthy witness tells you that in the next room there 
is a coin that always lands in the alternating sequence HTHTHT… (when tossed more than 
once). You should then expect the coin to land in this sequence, but it would call for explanation 
none the less.  
Often one finds in the literature that the notions of “calling for explanation” and “surprise” are 
confused, as if they mean the same thing.
21
 I suggest that this mistake has also misled intuitions 
about calling for explanation. That is because part of what makes an occurrence surprising is that 
it was unexpected. And this includes mathematical facts such as the calculator phenomenon. The 
fact that all calculator numbers are divisible by 37 is surprising in part because we would not 
have expected this to be the case prior to having been told or discovered by calculation that it is 
the case. However, surprise and calling for explanation are distinct notions. Being unexpected is 
a necessary condition for surprise, but not for calling for explanation.  
In sum, there is some correlation between having high epistemic probability, i.e. being expected, 
and not calling for explanation. That is why it seemed initially appealing to hypothesize that low 
probability is a necessary condition for calling for explanation (iii). However, as we have seen, 
this hypothesis fails upon examination.   
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5 Implications for reliability arguments 
The above results will help us make progress in understanding which facts call for explanation 
and why, a theoretical project interesting in its own right. But they also play an important role in 
determining specific applications of calling-for-explanation reasoning. In this section I explain 
how the insights of this article can help us make progress in assessing Hartry Field’s (1989, pp. 
25–30) influential reliability argument against mathematical Platonism. Field argues that "the 
correlation between mathematicians' belief states and the mathematical facts…is so striking as to 
demand an explanation" and he further argues that there are principled reasons to believe that 
Platonism deprives us of the possibility of such an explanation. This, Field argues, is a 
significant reason to reject Platonism. More recently it has been recognized that Field’s 
argument, if sound, generalizes to Platonism, or robust realism as the view is more often called 
these days, about other domains, such as normativity (Enoch, 2011, Chapter 7; Street, 2016) and 
logic (Schechter, 2010, 2018).  
To be sure, Field's style of argument, premised on the idea that some facts call for explanation in 
the relevant sense, is not the only epistemological argument against robust realist theories in 
abstract domains. Field himself was offering an improved version of Benacerraf's (1973) variant, 
and other theorists have offered yet other versions, that do not rely on the calling for explanation 
idea. However, Field's version is thought by many to have significant advantages over the others. 
Sharon Berry voices a shared sentiment that "unlike Benacerraf’s original access worry, Field’s 
formulation does not depend on any contentious assumptions about causal constraints on 
knowledge" (Berry, 2020). To this I add that it also does not depend, at least not in an obvious 
way, on modal conditions such as safety or sensitivity, which might be too easy to satisfy in the 
case of necessary truths, as Justin Clarke-Doane (2020, Chapter 4) argues. Similarly, David 
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Enoch argues at length that Field's style of argument is the best way to formulate the 
epistemological challenge for robust realism about normativity (Enoch, 2011, Chapter 7). 
One popular kind of response to Field's style of argument, sometimes called the trivializing 
response (Berry, 2020), runs along the following lines. What the robust realist must explain, it is 
argued, can be formulated as the following conjunction 
The set S of mathematical claims are true & mathematicians believe S.  
Then it is argued that the first conjunct does not require explanation, because necessary facts 
cannot call for explanation. Therefore, all that needs explaining is the second conjunct. The 
second conjunct, however, can in principle be explained by citing all the historical factors that 
led mathematicians to adopt their current beliefs. If the conjuncts are individually explained, 
then, some have argued, the conjunction is explained as well. Alternatively, if the conjunction is 
showed to be highly probable, because each of the conjuncts is highly probable, then it is thought 
to no longer call for explanation. Such moves are suggested, for instance, by Burgess and Rosen 
(1999, pp. 41–46), Pust (2004), Clarke-Doane (2016) and Baras (2017a). In ethics, a similar 
move has been defended by Enoch (2011, Chapter 7) and Weilenberg (2010) among others.
22
  
In response to the trivializing response, anti-Platonists have used examples from mathematics of 
the kind discussed in this paper to question the supposition that necessary facts cannot call for 
explanation. The most recent and explicit example is Sharon Berry, who uses an example to 
demonstrate that we have intuitions about mathematical results that call for explanation. 
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The history of John Conway’s “Monstrous Moonshine” conjecture … shows how 
discovering a relationship between pure mathematical facts which intuitively “cries out 
for explanation,” and, then, seeking such an explanation can lead to important discoveries 
even when a proof of both facts already exists. In this episode, mathematicians noticed 
that the same number—196,883—appeared in two seemingly unconnected areas of 
mathematics. It appeared both as one of the dimensions of the monster group (the largest 
of the sporadic simple groups) and as the first nontrivial coefficient of the j-function (an 
important function in number theory). Later mathematicians discovered further that the 
second nontrivial coefficient of the j-function was the sum of the first three special 
dimensions of the monster group…the fact that these coincidences seemed to call out for 
explanation motivated mathematicians to hypothesize a connection and eventually 
discover one which lead to deep mathematical insights. (Berry, 2020) 
She argues on this basis against trivializing responses to Field's argument. The results of our 
discussion provide us with new means to analyze Berry's argument, and to make progress in this 
debate. In one way, our results complement Berry's argument. Berry relies on the intuition that 
mathematical facts can call for explanation without exploring what impact this might have on 
general accounts of which facts call for explanation. She neither attempts to propose such an 
account, nor engages with existing ones. Here we argued that previous accounts fail, because 
they posit low prior probability as a necessary condition for calling for explanation. We further 
bolstered this claim using examples of contingent facts that call for explanation.  
However, in another way, this paper exposes a weakness in her argument. As explained in 
section ‎2, "calls for explanation" can mean more than one thing, and it is important to keep the 
various meanings apart. What her example shows is that a certain mathematical fact motivated a 
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certain fruitful research project, to find a mathematical explanation for a striking result. Calling 
for explanation here is used in sense 3, it means having reason to believe of a certain fact that it 
has an explanation. However, this is not the kind of example we need in order to defend Field's 
argument from trivializing responses. The sense of calling for explanation that Field needs is 
sense 4, according to which we should revise beliefs that imply that a certain fact is coincidental. 
Our discussion at the end of section ‎2 applies to Berry's example as well. Her example fails to 
show that mathematical facts call for explanation in the sense needed to support the reliability 
argument against mathematical Platonism.  
6 Conclusion 
We started with an incompatible triad of claims. By reflecting more deeply upon these claims, 
the seeming paradox has dissolved. We can now look again at the inconsistent triad and sum up 
what we have learned:  
(i) There are truths of classical logic that call for explanation.  
(ii) All truths of classical logic have high probability.  
(iii) A fact calls for explanation only if it has low prior probability.  
The first claim is ambiguous, depending on what is meant by “call for explanation”. According 
to one interpretation, it is not so clearly supported by mathematical examples of the kind given 
above. The second claim is also ambiguous, depending on what is meant by “probability”. On 
some interpretations it is an idealization that should be dropped in some contexts. The third 
claim, as it stands, is false. There is however a nearby truth, which is that in many cases, facts 
that call for explanation are also, non-coincidently, highly improbable. In addition, there is a 
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sense in which low probability is a necessary condition for surprise to be fitting, and surprise is 
often conflated with calling for explanation.    
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